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CARRIERS-FREIGHT SHIPMENT-NOTICE TO CONSIGNEE.-SEABOARD AIR
LINE Ry. Co. v. DIXON, 79 S. E. (GA.), 1118.-Held, that where shipments
of lumber in car load lots were consigned to a person at a named city, and
were transported to their destination over the railroad on which they were
shipped, and the consignee was given notice and afforded due opportunity
to receive and unload the lumber, the liability of the railroad company as
a common carrier ceased.
The cases are hopelessly in conflict as to the precise moment when the
liability of a railroad company as a common carrier ends, and the liability
of a warehouseman begins. Three different rules are recognized in the
decisions, known as the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York
rules. The Massachusetts rule holds that the liability of the company
terminates when the transit is ended, and the goods deposited safely on the
platform or in the warehouse of the road. Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M.
R. R. Co., 1 Gray (Mass.), 263. This rule has been followed in other juris-
dictions. R. R. Co. v. Pound, Ill Ga., 6; Schumacher v. R. R. Co., 207 Ill.,
199; R. R. Co. v. Revman, 73 N. E., 587; Mohr v. R. R. Co., 40 Ia., 579 ;Herf
& Frerichs Chem. Co. v. R. R. Co., 100 Mo. App., 164; Chalk v. R. R. Co., 85
N. C., 423; Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 Pa. 492; Spears vy R. R. Co.-11 S.
C., 158. The so-called New Hampshire rule holds that placing the goods in
the warehouse alone, does not discharge the company from liability as a
common carrier, until the consignee has had a reasonable time after their
arrival to inspect and take them away, in the ordinary course of business.
Moses v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 32 N. H., 523. This conclusion also has been
followed by many courts. Tallahasse Falls Mfg. Co. v. R. R. Co., 128 Ala.,
167; R. R. Co. v. Nevifl, 60 Ark., 375; R. R. Co. v. Newlarger & Bro., 67
Kans., 846; Wald v. R. R. Co., 92 Ky., 645; Maignan v. The Railroad, 24
La. Ann., 33; Winslow v. The Railroad, 42 Vt., .700; Berry v. R. R. Co.,
44 W. Va., 538; Backus v. R. R. Co., 922 Wis., 393. Under the New York
rule the law is stated to be that the liability of the company as a common
carrier continues until the consignee has been notified of the arrival of the
goods and has had a reasonable time in the ordinary course of business,
within which to remove them. Fenner v. Buffald & St. L. R. R. Co., 44
N. Y., 505. This rule has received judicial sanction in other jurisdictions.
Walters v. R. R. Co., 139 Mich., 303; Pinney v. R. R. Co., 19 Minn., 257;
R. R. Co. v. Fuqua & Horton, 84 Miss., 490; R. R. Co. v. Hatch, 52 Ohio
St., 408. Statutes have been passed in some states adopting this rule. See
Collins v. R. R. Co., 104 Ala., 390; Cavallaro v. R. R. Co., 110 Cal., 348;
R. R. Co. v. Naive, 112 Tenn., 239; R: R. Co. v. Haynes, 72 Tex., 175.
This is also the rule in England and Canada. Mitchell v. R. R. Co., L. R.
10 Q. B., 256; Richardson v. C. P. R. R. Co., 19 Ont. Rep., 369. The great
weight of authority, both in this country and in England, sustains the
New York rule. It would seem to be the better of the three, in that, even
when the goods have been safely deposited in a warehouse, they are still
in the custody, and under the control, of the carrier, with the same oppor-
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tunities to embezzle them, as when in transit. The same reasons, therefore,
upon which are based the severe accountability of the carrier for the
safety of the goods while they are strictly in transit, would seem to re-
quire that the company should be the custodian of the goods as carrier,
until they had either tendered them to the consignee, or had, after notify-
ing him of their arrival, given him a reasonable time within which to take
them away. The principal case is in accord with this conclusion.
CARRIERs-TRANSPORTATION OF BAGGAGE-RELATION OF CARRIER AND
PASSENGER.-ALABAMA GREAT So. Ry. v. KNOX, 63 So. REP., 538.-Where
a passenger purchases a ticket from one point to another over a carrier's
line and checks his baggage thereon, it is not necessary, in order to create
the relation of carrier and passenger with reference to the baggage, so as
to render the carrier liable as such for the loss thereof, that the passenger
should accompany the baggage either on the same train, or at all.
A traveller is not entitled to have his personal baggage carried in con-
sideration of fare paid by him, unless it is on same train which carries
him, is the general rule. Angell,' Carriers, Sections 107, 110; II Redf.
Railroads (4th edition), 39; Thompson, Carriers, 521, Section 8. In Hutch-
inson on Carriers, Vol. 3, page 1516, the rule is stated: "If that which
would have been baggage had it been accompanied by the owner should be
accepted when owner does not become a passenger, the carrier would not
be responsible for it as baggage." The rule is so laid down in most of the
cases. Glaso v. N. Y. Central, 36 Barb., 557; Wilson v. Grand Trunk, 56
Me., 60; Bomar v. Maxwell, 28 Tenn., 621; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y.,
594; Tewes v. Steamship Co., 85 N. Y. S., 60; Collins v. Railroad, 10
Cushing, 506. In Marshall v. Pontiac Railroad, 126 Mich., 45, it was held
that the company became a mere gratuitous bailee of baggage when the
owner did not accompany it. In Beer v. Railroad, 67 Conn., 417, in an
opinion written by Baldwin, J., it was held the company was not even
responsible as gratuitous bailee, when, through a mutual mistake, the
baggage was checked without the owner's having bought, or intending to
buy a ticket. In Elvira Harbeck, 2 Blatchf., 366, however, it was held the
company was a bailee for hire, and must exercise due care. In Shaw v.
Northern Pacific, 40 Minn., 110, the company was held liable as a com-
mon carrier for baggage shipped on a later train than the owner took.
However, this was for the company's convenience. In McKibben et als. v.
Wisconsin, Central Railroad, 100 Minn., 270, the general rule is criticized
but the decision is on another point. Th6 only case in harmony with
Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Knox, is Lamed v. Central R. R. of N. 1., 79
Atl., 289 (1911), in which there is a per curiai; decision without discus-
;ion. In view of modern conditions, it would seem that this is better than
the rigid, technical rule established when it was necessary, for the car-
rier's protection, that the traveller be on the train that carried his bag-
gage, and in most cases it would appear that the carrier is estopped by
his conduct from claiming the strict application of the rule. Unquestion-
ably the overwhelming weight of authority is against the principal case,
but there have been few adjudications of the point in recent years and the
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authority of the principal case and Larned v. Central R. R. of N. I., supra,
might now.be decisive in many jurisdictoins.
CONDUCT OF JUDGE-COMMENTS ON EV1DENCF-STATE V. OVERTON, 88
ATL., 689 (N. J.).-Held, that it is always the right and often the duty of
the judge to comment on the evidence and give the jury his impressions
of its weight and value, and such comment is not assignable for error as
long as the ultimate decision on disputed facts is plainly left to the jury.
The prevailing American rule is that instructions bearing on the weight
of evidence are erroneous. Harkey v. State, 43 Tex. Crim., 100; Burt v.
State, 72 Miss., 408; see State v. Main, 69 Conn., 123. So an instruction
that the evidence of a certain witness should be received with a great deal
of care was properly refused. Hronek v. People, 134 Ill., 139. An instruc-
tion that greater weight should be given to the evidence of those witnesses
whose means of knowledge was superior was error. Muncie Pulp Co. v.
Keesling, 166 Ind., 479. An instruction that the preponderance of evidence
is not to be determined merely by the number of witnesses on each side is
error. McCoy v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co., 82 Wis., 215, 52 N. W., 93 (and
cases there cited). But if the erroneous instruction is followed by another
and correct one, then the jury is not misled and there is no error. Garske
v. Ridgeville, 123 Wis., 503. The English rule is that the judge may charge
on matter of fact, it is stated by Lord Hale in his History of the Common
Law, that the jury is to have the benefit of the observation of the judge
both in point of law and in point of fact by way of direction. 2 Hale Hist.
Com. Law (5th ed.), 147-156. The courts seem to be in much greater ac-
cord on the proposition that the judge cannot instruct upon the weight of
evidence than they are on the question of whether he can comment on it
in any way, whether in the charge or not. In South Carolina, which is
the only state having a constitutional provision against charging the jury
on matter of fact, it has been held that a comment on the-weight of evi-
dence is erroneous even if the judge specifically states that the jury is not
to be bound by his opinion. State v. White, 15 S. C., 381. And sofie
courts go so far as to hold that the judge cannot use any language in the
hearing of the jury that can be construed into an expression of opinion
on the weight of evidence. State v. Shuff. 9 Idaho, 115. He cannot assist
the jury to remember whether certain evidence was offered or not. State
v. Foster, 40 Atl.. 939 (Del.); affirmed, 43 Atl., 265; see also U. S. v.
Briggs, 19 D. C., 585. He cannot state the evidence in his charge. State
v. Atkins, 49 S. C., 481; contra, Redding v. Ry. Co., 5 S. C., 69. There is a
formidable line of authority opposing the doctrine just stated and holding
that a judge may comment on the evidence within certain limits. He may
make such comments as will enable the jury to see the relevancy and per-
tinency of the evidence to the particular issue involved. People v. Fan-
ning, 131 N. Y., 659. He may sum up the evidence. Driskill v. State, 7
Tnd., 338. And make such comment as his judicial discretion may dictate.
State v. Valentine, 71 N. J. L., 552. But not to the prejudice of either
party. People v. Bonds, 1 Nev., 33; State v. Stowell, 60 Iowa, 535. He
should recallI and collate the testimony. State v. Gratton, 95 Me., 364. And
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it is error not to do so. State v. Brainard, 25 Iowa, 572. If there is no
conflict, the judge may assume the evidence to be true and charge upon it
directly without any hypothesis. Byron v. State, 117 Ala., 80. It is not
error for the judge to refuse to charge the jury that they are not abso-
lutely bound by the opinion of the court on matter of fact. People v. Haw-
kins, 106 Mich., 479. The better rule seems to support the principal case,
the courts in accord are of greater number than those contra and are in
the older states.
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT-EQUITY DAIES v. BOWES, U. S. Dis-
TRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, Nov., 1913.-Plaintiff em-
ployed by and having been assigned the copyright privileges of the
Evening Sun, wrote and published a short story under the caption, "News
of the Theatres?;. The story was cast in the form of an actual occurrence
to make it more "striking". One Kenyon, on reading the story, thought it
was the statement of an actual occurrence, and from it constructed a play
called "Kindling". Defendant produced the play. Plaintiff brought this
action for infringement of copyright. Held, one who publishes news as
fiction cannot obtain a valid copyright.
It is well established in England that a newspaper is a subject of copy-
right. Cote v. Newspaper Co., 58 L. 3. Rep., 288; Trade Auxiliaty Co. v.
Protective Association, 58 L. 3., 293. In the United States the contrary
doctrine appears to prevail. Claton et al. v. Stone et al., Fed Case, 2872;
Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116 Fed., 126; Harper v.
Shoppel, 26 Fed., 519. But news is not a subject of copyright. State ex
rel Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo., 410. That which is de-
signed to convey information or to explain is a proper subject for copy-
right. Ainberg File & Index Co. v. Shea, Smith & Co., 82 Fed., 314; Baker
v. Selden, 101 U. S., 99. There can be no copyright in a publication whose
effect is to encourage crime, or is indecent and pernicious per se, or in a
dramatice composition which. is grossly indecent and calculated to corrupt
the morals of the people. Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady, 216; Richard-
soin v. Miller, 3 L. & Eq. Rep., 614. Where there is a false pretense as to
atthorship, such transaction is a fraud on the public and defeats the copy-
right. Byron v. Johnston, 2 Meriv., 29; Seeley v. Fisher, 11 Sim., 581.
While this decision may be sound in denying the plaintiff a right to recover
damages, it is clearly erroneous in holding that the plaintiff obtained no
valid copyright, and is without authority to support it. In view of the
authorities cited, the plaintiff would clearly be entitled to a copyright, but
having obtained a copyright and having published his work as an account
of ar actual occurrenfce and without any notice of his copyright, or that it
was only fiction, he ought not now be heard to complain.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONTRACTS OF WIFE-BINDING EFFECT.-WARDEN
ET -UX. V. MIDDLETON ET AL., 161 S. W. (ARK.), 151.-Held, a married
woman was not personally liable on a note executed by her for her hus-
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band's accommodation for the purchase price of a jack in which she had
no interest.
At common law a married woman could not bind herself by a contract.
Pollock On Contracts,, 4 ed., pp.. 148, 149. The right to make contracts
has been conferred by statute, and courts have construed such statutes
strictly. If a note is given by husband and wife in payment of money
loaned the husband, the wife is not liable on the note unless it can be
affirmatively shown that the consideration for the note passed to the wife;
Fisk v. Mills, 104- Mich., 433; or was for the benefit of her separate estate.
March, Price & Co. v. Clark, 14 Fed., 406. A married woman cannot enter
into contracts of securityship. Cummings v. Martin, 128 Ind., 20; Wester-
velt v. Baker, 56 Neb., 63. Hence a wife cannot bind herself on a note
given as security for her husband. Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Ba., 125. If the con-
sideration for a note was received by her husband, or went to pay his
debts or liabilities for which neither she nor her separate were bound,
it will be held a contract of securityship and not binding on the wife. Way
v. Peck, 47 Conn., 27; Vogel v. Lechncr, 102 Tnd., 55; Saulsbury v. Weaver,
59 Ga., 254. But some courts have held that if she contracted as principal
in fact, she is bound, though it is not shown that the consideration was
beneficial to her or her separate estate. Po!ter et al. v. Sheets et al., 5 Ind.
App., 506. It is well settled in New Hampshire that where a married
woman- gives her note in return for a loan to her husband to enable him
to pay his debts or to engage in business, she is liable. lona Savings Bank
v. Boynton, 69 N. H., 77; Jackson v. Holt, 64 N. H., 478. Georgia in the
case of Rood v. Wright, 124 Ga., 489, followed the New Hampshire rule,
although in an earlier case, Veal v. Hurt, 63 Ga., 728, the contrary was
held. Massachusetts has extended the New Hampshire rule and held she
is liable as an accommodation indorser. Middleborough Nat. Bank v. Cole,
191 Mass., 168; Binney v. Globe Nat. Bank, 150 Mass., 574. The holding of
the principle case illustrates the slowness of the courts in extending to
married women the rights the legislatures intended to confer. While the
weight of authority is doubtless in accord with this decision, yet there
seems to be a tendency in the opposite direction. With the advent of
women more and more into political and commercial life this decision
probably would not be generally followed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-INJURY DUE To FAILURE TO REPAIR-CovE-
NANT TO REPAIR-GUEST.-VIEHER V. OSRORNE, 34 PAc., 1092 (WASH.).-
geld, that where a landlord covenanted to repair the demised premises
there arose the antecedent duty to inspect the same for concealed dangers,
and he is charged with knowledge of what a reasotiable inspection on his
part would ha.ve discovered; hence, where a child fell through the top of
a concealed cesspool while playing on the premises, and such defect would,
have been discovered by the landlord upon reasonable inspection, he was
liable as for a tort.
It is conceded that a guest of the tenant is.so far identified with him
that his right to recover is the same as the tenant's, Davis v. Pacific Power
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Co., 107 Cal., 563; Wilcox v. Zane, 167 Mass., 302; Fisher v. Jansen, 128
Ill., 549. But as to the landlord's liability on his covenant to repair as re-
gards injuries to a stranger there is conflict. Some courts are of the
opinion that the covenant to repair will not inure to the benefit of a
stranger to it and no tort liability as to such stranger will ensue for a
breach. May v. Ennis, 78 N. Y. App. Div., 552; Burdick v. Cheadle, 26
Ohio St., 393; Davis v. Smith, 26 R. I., 129. The other view, supported by
the weight of authority, is to the effect that the landlord's liability is for
negligence, and the covenant being a mere matter of inducement, he is
liable for want of due care in not making repairs. Boyce v. Snow, 187 II1.,
181; Campbell v. Portland Sigar Co., 62 Me., 552; Barron v. Liedhoif,. 95
Minn., 474; and for defects which existed at the time he parted with the
control as well as those arising later. Moody v. New York, 43 Barb. N. Y.,
282; Davenport v. Buckman, 10 Bosw., 20; Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 T. R.,
318. Nevertheless, adopting the latter ruling, the courts have established
the general proposition, apparently contrary to the principal case, that
whether the landlord's duty to -make repairs arises out of contract or by
operation of law, actual notice of the defect must be brought home- to him,
or the fact proved that it existed for so long a time that he is chargeable
with constructive notice, in order to hold him liable. Gately v. Campbell,
124 Cal., 520; Greene v. Hague, 10 Ill. App., 598; Galvin v. Beals, 187
Mass., 250; Vorrath v. Burke, 63 N. J. L., 188; Idel v. Mitchell, 158 N. Y.,
134; Tredway v. Machin, 91 L. T. R. (N. S.), 310. The English decisions
go even further in holding that though there be a covenant to repair, ex-
press notice is necessary, Tredway v. Machin, supra, and that means of
knowledge is immaterial, -Hugall v. McLean, 53 L. T. R., 94. Following
this idea, some cases in this country hold that a covenant to repair means
to repair only within a reasonable time after notice. Spellman v. Bannigan,
36 Hun. (N. Y.), 174;. Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal., 173. And others, that
though the defendant agreed to repair, yet if he did not and the plaintiff
knew that fact, there can be no recovery. Shackford v. Coffin, 95 Me.,
69. A contrary rule obtains in a few jurisdictions. There it is held that
if it is the landlord's duty to repair, he is liable for want of due care in
not repairing, whether he has notice or not of the defect; Leydecker v.
Brintnall, 158 Mass., 292; Wilber v. Follansbee, 97 Wis., 577; Wertheimer
v. Saunders, 95 Wis., 573; especially if the locus in question be a common
way, Lindsay v. Leigton, 150 Mass., 285; or if the tenant did not know of
the defect and the landlord knew or by the exercise of due care could
have known. Sternberg v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn., 163; Hines v. Wilcox, 96
Tenn., 325. The Canadian view is that notice is immaterial, for it is the land-
lord's duty to inspect the premises from time to time to see if they need re-
pair, and he is charged with what he might have discovered. Troude v. Mel-
drum, 21 Que. Sup. Ct., 75. It is to be noted that in examining the cases
cited in 24 Cyc., 1120, and elsewhere as supporting the general rule that the
landlord must have notice; in thirteen cases out of fifteen there was no
covenant to repair, and that fact was mentioned by the court Ps a material
circumstance in deciding the case. Thus it would seem that the holding
of the principal case at least states a debatable proposition in spite of the
general assumption to the contrary. See XXIII Yale Law Journal, 2, 184.
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LANDLORD AND TFINANT-INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONs-LIA-
BILITY OF LANDLORD-COVENANTS.-MORODER V. Fox, 143 N. W., 1040.-Held,
that a lease of the first floor and part of the basement of a three-story
building contained an agreement by the lessee to take all necessary pre-
cautions to prevent damages to any of the water pipes upon "said prem-
ises" and to let the water out of the pipes whenever it should be necessary
to do so to prevent it from injuring pipes and property. There was but
one set of water pipes, and the turn-off was located in the basement. It
was held "said premises" referred to the leased premises only and that the
lessor, knowing the second floor was vacant and unheated, and that the
water pipes supplying the third story with water were uncovered and un-
protected from frost, was negligent in allowing them to remain so in the
winter, andwas liable for damages to lessee's goods caused by the burst-
ing of pipes, as a result of the water freezing.
As between different tenants under a common landlord, the question
is always one of negligence in the use of the premises. Eakin v. Brown,
1 E. D. Smith, 36; Steinway v. Biel, 47 N. Y. S., 678; Levy v. Korn, 61
N. Y. S., 1109; Toole v. Beckett, 67 Me., 544. Where water in a tenement
house overflows to injury of personal property of tenant in lower floor,
he has no remedy over against his landlord, without proof that the over-
flow was due to the landlord's negligence. Becker v. Bullowa, 73 N. Y. S.,
944. In Bernhard v. Reeves, 6 Wash.. 424, it was held there was no pre-
sumption the leak was due to the negligence of the user. Greco v. Bern-
heimer, 40 N.1 Y. S:, 677, contra. In the principal case, the questions are
as to the defendant's negligence, and the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In Buckley v. Cunninghain, 105 Ala., 449, the plaintiff was refused a rem-
edy under a similar state of facts, even though, in that case, there was no
covenant by the plaintiff. The defendant had control of the upper room
in which the leakage occurred, but the only stop-cock was on the pavement,
and it was held equally the duty of plaintiff to have the water cut off.
Taylor v. Bailey, 74 Ill., 178, accord. In Ortmayer v. Johnson, 45 Ill., 460,
the plaintiff had agreed to turn off the water from a master stop-cock in
the basement and was refused a remedy in an action against upper tenarts
who had left a faucet open and flooded the lower premises. Priest v.
Nichols, 116 Mass., 401, is the strongest case in support of the decision in
Moroder v. Fox, but the facts of the latter case seem to n gative the de-
fendant's negligence, inasmuch as he had taken a covenant from the plain-
tiff and imposed upon him the duty of preventing such leaks. Actionable
negligence is further negatived by the fact that under all the circumstances
of this case the plaintiff seems to have been equally at fault.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONs-AcKNOWI.EDGMENT-NEW PROMISE OR PART
PAYMENT.-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OXFORD V. KING ET AL., 85 S. E. (N.
C.) 251.-Held, that where a debtor, to secure his note, left collaterals
with a bank and constituted the cashier his agent, in case of default, to
sell and apply the proceeds to the note, and promised to pay any deficiency,
a sale and application of the proceeds by the cashier amounted to a volun-
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tary payment by the debtor sufficient to interrupt the statute of limitations.
Clark and Hoke, JJ., dissenting.
Where a voluntary payment on a debt barred by the statute is made
by the principal it operates to lift the bar. Garrett v. Reeves, 125 N. C., 529.
The payment must be made by the debtor or by someone duly authorized
by him to make it. Murdock v. Waterman, 145 N. Y., 55. By someone
who has agreed in writing with the debtor to pay the debt. Huntington v.
Chesmore, 60 Vt., 566. By one who could be compelled to pay. In re
Frisby, 43 Ch. Div., 106. By one who has answered the debt. Cockfield v.
Farley, 21 La. Ann., 521. Or by a stranger who makes it at the request
and in the presence and with the consent of the debtor. Chapman v. Boyce,
16 N. I., 237. The above cases refer to cash payments, but it has been
held that where the debt has been barred by the statute a cash payment
of money as security for the debtor is not sufficient. Jones v. Jones, 23
Ark., 212. Nor is the allowance of a dividend from an assigned estate.
Walter A. Wood, etc. Co. v. Harris, 212 Pa., 452. But that the application
of the proceeds of a life insurance policy assigned to the creditor is suf-
ficient to toll the statute; see In re Conlan, L. R. 29 Ir., 199. Where the
president of an insolvent corporation, with the consent of its stockholders.
turns over its assets to a committee of its creditors to be divided equitably
among them, it was held that a payment by them would not avoid the
statute, as it would not raise any new promise on the part of the corpora-
tion. Kilton v. Providence Tool Co., 22 R. I., 605. Many jurisdictions
recognize the rule that the effect of leaving collaterals with the creditor
by the -debtor as part payment of the debt, the proceeds to be applied to
the debt is sufficient to interrupt the statute. Haven v. Hathaway, 20 Me..
345; Taylor v. Foster, 132' Mass., 30; Sornberger v. Lee, 14 Neb., 193;
New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Tooker, 4 N. J. L., 334; Fletcher v. Brainard,
75 Vt., 300. But the collaterals must be realized on within a reasonable
time. Porter v. Blood, 5 Pick., 54. And if the collaterals were delivered
after the delivery of the note, then there will be a suspension of the statute
from the date of the delivery of the collaterals. Acker v. Acker, 81 N. Y.,
143. The case of Boulder Nat. State Bank v. Rowland, 1 Colo. App., 468,
is directly in point with the principal case; there it was held that under
such circumstances the statute would be interrupted. While in New York
it was held that such payment would not revive the debt if the time inter-
vening between the delivery of the collateral and the collecting and credit-
ing of the proceeds exceeds the time limited by the statute. Harper v.
Fairley, 53 N. Y., 442. Especially where there is no present agreement
that the proceeds shall be so applied. Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan., 94; Crow
v. Gleason, 141 N. Y., 489 (reversing 20 N. Y. S., 590). There must at
least be notice to and assent by the debtor of the application of the pro-
ceeds. Eaton v. Lehan, 63 N. H., 619. The rule in Minnesota is that not
even notice to and failure of the debtor to object will make the payment
available to suspend the statute if the collaterals are delivered at the time
of delivery of the note. Wolford v. Cook, 71 Minn., 77. The whole reason
for the doctrine in the principal case seems to be that the debtor intends
to pay the debt and waive the bar and it is hard to justify cases where the
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collaterals are delivered at the time the debt is incurred and where the
statute is declared raised upon the sale and application of the proceeds
after the debt has been barred. In such cases it is held that the right to
take advantage of the statute is waived from the beginning and it is going
very far when it is said that such an intention exists in the mind of a
debtor who takes collaterals to a bank and appoints the cashier his agent
to secure the debt with the collaterals. The principal case, however, ac-
cords wih the numerical weight of authority.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO MINOR EMPLOYE-CHILD LABOR
LAW.-ELK COTTON MILLS v. GRANT, 79 S. E., 836 (GA.) .- Held, the em-
ployment of a minor under the prescribed age in a factory, in disobedience
of the statute prohibiting such employment, is negligence per se, and, if
any injury to such child proximately result from the employment, a right
of action in its favor arises.
In general it is the duty of the master to use all reasonable diligence,
care and caution in providing for the safety of his servants. Frank v.
Otis, 15 N. Y. St. Rep., 681. The mere employment of a minor about
dangerous work without his parents' consent, is not negligence per se,
so as to render the employer liable. Penn. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind., 250; Tex.
& P. Ry Co. v. Carlton, 60 Tex., 397. Under statutory provisions, how-
ever, there is a conflict as to whether or not such employment constitutes
negligence per se. Ash v. Verlenden, 154 Pa., 246, held inexperience and
want of knowledge must be shown. Belles v. Jackson, 4 Pa. Dist. R., 194;
W7hite v. Witemann Co., 131 N. Y., 631, accord. In New York the last
named case overruled Cook v. Lalance Grosiean Co., 33 Hun., 351, which
held, in harmony with the principal case, that such employment was neg-
ligence per se. Nickey v. Stender, 164 Ind., 189; American Car Co. v.
Armentraut, 214 Ill., 509; Queen v. Dayton, 95 Tenn., 458; Ornamental
Iron Co. v. Green, 108 Tenn., 161, held there was negligence per se. A
similar devision in Lee v. Sterling Co., 93 N. Y. S., 560, was reversed in
101 N. Y. S., 78. The case of Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant accords with the
majority view, which seems to be based on a reasonable interpretation of
the statute. The theory of the case is that the violation of a statutory
duty is equivalent to a violation of a common law duty, and there arises
a consequenial liability for the proximate results of such violation.
PLEADINGs-ALTERNATE ALLEGATIONS-ELEcTIoN.-LouIsvfLLE & N.
R. R. Co. v. STRANGE'S ADx., 161 S. W. (KY.), 239.-In an action for the
death of the carrier's servant, plaintiff, not knowing whether the train at
the time of her intestate's death was engaged in interstate or intrastate
commerce, but that one or the other was true, sought to join a cause of
action at common law with one under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
Defendant moved that plaintiff be required to elect whether she would
proceed under the state or Federal law. Held, the rights and liabilities of
the parties under the Federal and state law being essentially different,
defendant was entitled to compel plaintiff to elect under which she would
proceed. Nunn, J., dissented.
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At common law less particularity was required where the facts lay
more in the knowledge of the opposite party than of the party pleading.
Hezrd. Civil Pleading, pp. 264, 265. The common law rules of pleading
have been modified or changed by the introduction of the Code System.
Two causes of action may be set forth in different counts provided they
are all of the same character, that is, all sound in tort or in contract.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga., 404. When the plaintiff has two
or more grounds of recovery in the same cause of action, there is a con-
flict of authority whether he must elect on which ground he will proceed.
If the plaintiff knows on which ground he is entitled to recover, he must
elect. Harris v. Wabash Ry. C6., 51 Mo. App., 125; Matz v. Chicago &
A. R. R. Co., 88 Fed., 770 If it is not necessary to protect the plaintiff's
rights to set forth his cause of action in different counts, .he must elect.
Bishop v. Chicago & N. TV. R. R. Co., 67 Wis., 610. But if the allegations
are so clear that no unreasonable burden is placed on the defendant, plain-
tiff is not bound to elect. Forrester v. Reliable Transfer Co., 118 Pac.
(Wash.), 753. If there is a fair and reasonable doubt of the plaintiff's
ability to safely plead his cause of action in mode only, he is not bound to
elect. Wilson v. Smith, 61 Colo., 299. But some authorities hold that after
the plaintiff's evidence is all in, then he must elect on which count he will
go to the jury. Carroll v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 137 S. W. (Mo.),
303; Knopf v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 131 S. W. (Mo.), 707. There
is considerable authority to the contrary. Luken v. L. S. & M. S., 154
Mich,. 550; Devine, Adin. v. Chicago & Calumet River R. R. Co., 158 Ill..
550. The practice of allowing or disallowing a motion to elect is a matter
within the sound discretion of the court. Manders v. Croft, 3 Colo. App.,
236; Plummer v. Mold, 22 Minn., 15; Keer v. Hayes, 35 N. Y., 331. Some
jurisdictions do not require an election, although the grounds of liability
and the measure of damages in each count are different. Where a carrier
was charged on the separate grounds of carrier and of warehouseman.
the plaintiff was not bound to elect. Whitney v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 27
Wis., 327. Where the declaration was laid in two counts, one under one
statute and the other under another statute, and the rights under one were
inconsistent with the rights under the other, and the measure of damages
was different in each case, the plaintiff was not bound to elect. Carbary
v. Detroit United Rys., 157 Mich., 683; Ely v. Same, 162 Mich., 287. The
principal case illustrates the tenacity with which courts adhere to the old
common law system of pleading. The decision is not in accord with the
weight of authority and is repugnant to the spirit of the Codes.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTs-TEACHERS-REMOVAL.-PEOPLE EX
REL. PEIXOTTO v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF N. Y., 144 N. Y. S., 87.-Greater
New York, Charter Sec. 1093, provides that a teacher may be removed for
misconduct, insubordination, neglect of duty and general inefficiency, while
the by-laws of the school board provide that a teacher's absence may be
excused when caused by serious personal illness, death in the teacher's
immediate family, compliance with the requirements of the court, and
quarantine established by the board of health. Held, that as a female
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teacher might marry without being subject to removal, the charter grounds
being exclusive, and as serious personal illness will, under by-laws, excuse
absence, the absence of a married female teacher on account of maternity
does not constitute neglect of duty authorizing dismissal.
It has been held that a school board cannot arbitrarily exercise power
of dismissal. School District No. 94 v. Gautier, 13 Ok1., 194. In New York
a by-law providing that if a female teacher should marry, her place would
be vacant, was held void as in conflict with tle charter, the provisions of
which are exclusive. People v. Maxwell, 117 N. Y., 494 (reversing People
v. Maxwell, 87 App. Div., 131. This decision is fundamental, for it leaves
for the principal case only the decision of whether or not maternity is
such an illness as is contemplated by the by-law in regard to "serious per-
sonal illness". Illness includes any attack less than a disease. Conn. Mur.
Co. v. Union Trust, 5 Sup. Ct. (N. Y.), 119. At early common law,
maternity was held not to be illness. In Reg. v. Walker, 1 F. & F., 534,
illness from confinement was declared to be an ordinary state, and not
such illness as contemplated by the statute, which provided for the absence
of witnesses "so ill as not to be able to travel". Reg. v. Wilton, 1 F. &. F.,
309; Archbolds Critm. Cas. (18th ed.), p. 267, accord. The contrary, how-
ever, and what seems now the settled rule, was held in Reg. v. Stephen-
son, 9 Cox C. C., 156; Queen v. Wellings, 3 Q. B. D., 426. People v. Board
of Education adopts this view as being in accord with the intention of the
legislature and refuses to imply, as a condition of the contract, that it
should be terminable in the event of the relator's giving birth to a child.
The court intimates that the validity of such a condition, if expressed,
would be questionable. The gravamen of the case is, that if a teacher
cannot be removed because of her marriage (People v. Maxwell, supra)
she cannot be removed because of an act which is a natural incident ot
her marriage.
